On May 9th, the SAIS Review of International Affairs hosted Vanda Felbab-Brown, of the Brookings Institution, for a dynamic and engaging discussion of the illicit economy and how it relates to state-building, governance, and violence. The SAIS Review’s Managing Editor, Nic Wondra, a second-year Russian and Eurasian Studies concentrator, offers his own reflections in an in-depth editorial on Dr. Felbab-Brown’s discussion and its implications for states.

Reflections

The state is a strange creature. Today we have a Westphalian system that has evolved through the tumult of a Yalta-Potsdam referendum and two great periods of de-colonization. In spite of these turbulent eras, the modern state system is still unprecedented in human history.

Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown’s discussion at SAIS on May 9 touched upon some fundamental questions in contemporary political science: what a state does, where states can be successful, and how threats to states can be managed. Her observations contribute to a long line of literature including Mancur Olson’s “Roving Bandit” and Douglas North’s work on the origins of institutional governance.

Dr. Felbab-Brown posed an astute question to the audience: “What is politics about, if not the allocation of violence and public goods?” This cuts to the heart of a state’s prerogatives and responsibilities. In many cases of enduring conflict, the formal or recognized state is in a precarious position, if not absent entirely. Felbab-Brown has drawn a parallel between the legitimacy cultivated by organized criminal groups through the provision of public goods, and the legitimacy squandered by formal states through haphazard coercion. In places where the labor market may be strongly dependent on an illicit sector, such as in Colombia, where the coca cultivation economy looms large, organized criminals are deeply entrenched and command a great deal of legitimacy. In this context, state efforts to combat organized groups with violence may do more harm than good for the state’s longevity.

In places where the state actively confronts organized criminal institutions, the least adept criminals are eliminated first, incentivizing a rapid and heavily vertical consolidation of organized crime. This “natural selection” of the most capable criminals may do more damage to the legitimacy of a weak state than to strengthen it. The process simultaneously costs the formal government political capital while thinning the field of informal players. Felbab-Brown advocates for a partial re-conceptualization of this problem as a “competition in state-making.”

This paradox of using violence for political ends has been around longer than political science has been a discipline. Eminent scholars such as Charles Tilley described the historical process of European state consolidation as a messy and imprecise affair. Francis Fukuyama, in his 2010 piece entitled “Transitions to Rule of Law,” explains the importance of transcendental law–the religious origins of political orders. This is only the tip of the iceberg in terms of governance inputs. The period of European nation-state formation was not only violent, but influenced by a great many factors, including merchant law, the Church, customary and traditional organization, and strong economic interests. The product of these many influences helped to generate sets of institutions and norms that are now consolidated as states. Even in the most democratic and inclusive states today, we find a history of corruption and extortion. While not preferred to a well-functioning neoliberal state, a system rife with corruption and extortion represents a state policy choice—the co-option of elites—which is often superior to promulgating violence.

The policy spectrum that ranges from co-option to coercion, as Felbab-Brown explained, requires re-thinking “the nature of the citizen-state relationship.” Governance in many places is more complicated than the maxim “if you can’t beat’em, join’em.” The nature of the social contract, along with state capacity, must be taken into account when making policy decisions that represent tough choices. Sometimes short-term priorities overwhelm longer-term governance goals. Socializing criminals into formal political structures may be on the menu of solutions.

From the perspective of the state, a short-term solution that combines co-option and coercion of criminal actors may be the optimal policy choice. Time will tell whether the Westphalian state system can remain robust when faced with quasi-state threats and incentives. If a criminal network in an inefficient state provided my physical security or a child’s vaccine, I would wonder whether my local warlord might be the best governor. A question for democratically-oriented development specialists is whether certain public goods must be provided by the state or can be provided in alternative ways.

Despite my democratic leanings, capacity to govern should be assessed as more important than whether that governance is democratic or even inclusive. As pessimistic as it sounds, political organization will not naturally converge toward democracy. Realistic expectations of state-making, instead of a fatalist belief in “The End of History,” are needed.

–Nic Wondra, Managing Editor

A review of Dr. Felbab-Brown’s book, Shooting Up, will appear in the upcoming issue of The SAIS Review of International Affairs.

Defining Intifadat and Why Now?

There are several factors that identify an intifada. First, intifadat have ill-defined structural and procedural goals that are not fully revolutionary. Intifadat occur in populations with a youth demographic bulge, and in regions with economic conditions that exacerbate the j-curve effect; that is, a heightened disparity between expectations and reality.[i] In Egypt, more than one-third of the population of more than 83 million is between 15 and 29 years old.[ii] This group has a 25 percent unemployment rate, compared to the global average of 14.4 percent, and 95 percent of unemployed young people have a secondary education or more.[iii]

Additionally, intifadat occur within regimes that are weakened through processes that delegitimize the social contract. For example, Egypt’s authoritarian president, Hosni Mubarak, attempted to portray Egypt as a legitimate democracy, despite his repressive policies. Furthermore, increased communication as a result of the Internet, cell phones, and social media accelerate the ability of intifadat to mobilize.[iv] While these technologies facilitate large-scale organization, they do not provide for clear leadership. Finally, while there may be one or many organizations shepherding a given intifada, there is no significant organizational structure and hierarchy within an intifada. Egypt fit each of these elements, and was thus exceptionally prone to an intifada.

While these characteristics can explain why a country might be prone to an intifada, they cannot explain why the intifada in Egypt happened when it did. There must be a trigger for an intifada—something that sparks a pre-existing powder keg. However, it is challenging to predict which events will trigger an intifada because similar events, such as policy brutality, may have occurred in the past without sparking a movement. Triggers within intifadat tend to have snowballing effects as the original incident becomes viral.[v] In Egypt, multiple triggers coalesced until citizens were inspired to stand up suddenly to the regime.

The 2011 murder of twenty-eight year-old Alexandria resident Khaled Said by police, which incited the “We Are All Khaled Said” Facebook movement, was the first trigger of the uprising. The April 6 labor movement also mobilized on Facebook to seek justice for workers.[vi][vii] These movements represented new approaches for voicing opposition to the regime, facilitated by the rise of social media.[viii] Additionally, the close timeframe of the Tunisian intifada, Police Day in Egypt, and the 2010 Egyptian elections provided a stark contrast between the Tunisian intifada and the state-endorsed abuse of Egyptian citizens, making the repressive conditions in Egypt less tenable.[ix] President Mubarak’s faux-concessions throughout the uprising, and the thugs Mubarak hired to intimidate protestors, galvanized the protesters. The Egyptian military’s decision not to use violence against the population created a decreased sense of danger, as well. The proclamations of key opposition leaders during the intifada also weakened the regime’s credibility. Finally, a worker’s strike created the perception that the Mubarak regime no longer retained control of mainstream groups.

These triggers were mutually reinforcing and lowered the cost of participation for new activists, creating sustained and far-reaching mobilization.[x] Yet the participants of the uprising were not a group united by hardened stances and shared goals; rather, their mobilization was the result of ongoing reactions to trigger events and the actions of the regime.[xi] [xii] [xiii] This process is typical of intifadat and explains why they will have limited success in transforming societies, due to their reactionary nature and lack of clear objectives.

The Transformational Limitations of Intifadat

To understand the limitations and opportunities of an intifada, and the potential for lasting democracy in Egypt, it is best to first establish how intifadat differ from riots and revolutions. Riots are urban, spontaneous, and issue-based. They begin when citizens make a tangible request from their government, rather than demanding a change of government.[xiv][xv][xvi] The state reacts in accordance with the social contract.[xvii] In contrast, a revolution entails an upending of the socio-political pyramid, rapid change, and violence, according to Theda Skocpol.[xviii] For Skocpol, revolution is a product of the rise of capitalism and a transformation of societies in response.[xix]

According to Samuel Huntington, revolution is “a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, its political institutions, social structure, leadership and government activity and policies.”[xx] From this perspective, revolution is a characteristic of modernization—it will not occur in highly traditional societies with low levels of social and economic complexity, nor will it occur in highly modern societies.[xxi] A revolution concludes with the creation and institutionalization of a new political order.[xxii][xxiii]

Given this understanding of both riots and revolutions, it is clear that neither a riot nor a revolution occurred in Egypt, but rather, a hybrid. The Egyptian uprising was less spontaneous than a riot, it was more organized, and there was not a substantive demand to which the regime could respond. The Egyptian uprising cannot be defined as a revolution because its aims, goals, and organization were not in the pursuit of upending the socio-political structure of Egypt. While many protestors expressed a desire for liberty, freedom, and an end to corruption, the movement did not clearly articulate objectives or organize around tangible goals that would bring about a new system. For a revolution to occur in Egypt, it would have been necessary for protestors to seize power from the military and to establish a new socio-political order, with redistribution of power and new political institutions.[xxiv]

Within the context of intifadat as a twenty-first century middle ground between riots and revolutions, it appears that intifadat are a product of countries that have experienced a modernization program and a form of soft-dictatorship; that is, illiberal, authoritarian systems that have a semblance of “democracy.” These forms of government have some degree of freedom, as well as elections and constitutions, yet in reality, the rule of law and the legitimacy of elections are limited and a dictator or strongman rules. This particular mix demonstrates the illegitimacy of the regime to the populace.

While norms and values differ by country and region, the world seems to have reached a tipping point where most citizens aspire to democratic forms of government.  According to Stephen Grand, “Democracy has acquired the status of a near-universal norm. In public opinion surveys, the majority of citizens in most countries around the world express a preference for democracy over other forms of government.”[xxv] Democracy allows for integration into the world capitalist economy, and appears to be the best model for the extension of civil liberties and economic opportunity.

Yet the success of an intifada, and its calls for the creation of some form of democracy, is difficult to measure. In response to world norms of democracy, the regimes in intifada-prone countries generally attempt to appear like liberal democracies. Given this context, it is not necessary to stage a revolution, but instead to establish institutions that provide the freedoms and opportunities expected in a democracy. However, it is difficult to measure the success of these new institutions, compared to the clear outcomes of a revolution.

Intifadat are limited by the electronic nature of their mobilization, as well. While mobilization may surge at the intifada’s crescendo (an estimated six million Egyptians protested at some point during the uprising, according to the Abu Dhabi Gallup Center), participants are not unified by a single organization or hierarchy.[xxvi] Online dialogues are limited in scope, and the interpersonal connections between participants are constrained by virtue of the interface. Therefore, electronic mobilization prevents the formation of a coherent, unified message, or a single leader representing the movement. Additionally, the movement is also constrained in its ability to transform the uprising into a permanent force that can continuously negotiate and assess the progress of the intifada. Consequently, the Egyptian intifada succeeded only in authoritarian liberalization–the liberalization of the existing Egyptian regime–rather than permanent change.

The intifada in Egypt was also structurally limited by the country’s strong military, both as a force and as a social institution. The key variable in a successful revolution is the disestablishment of the regime’s military, or at least the handover of control to the protestors, neither of which occurred in Egypt. Instead, what occurred was a military-led transition by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Given its high organizational capacity, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to create pacts with the military, which created a diverse and largely legitimate alternative to the former regime. However, the new regime certainly did not embrace the full scope of changes articulated by many protestors. The Muslim Brotherhood broke from the liberals and supported the 19 March 2011 constitutional amendments by the SCAF.

In their work Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter examine the limitations of military-led democratic transitions, and shed light on the parameters of change that can be expected from intifadat that occur in countries where the military is strong and remains in power. First, the authors assert there must be “a clear distinction between the ‘liberalization’ of an authoritarian regime and full democratization.”[xxvii] Within this volume, Alfred Stepan discusses the possibilities for democratization led by “military-as-government,” or “military-as-institution,” which accurately describes the situation in Egypt. Stepan argues that the military will push for democratization, while maintaining a number of emergency powers, if its interests will be served by the transition. According to Stepan, this push for democratization is likely to occur in response to foreign imposition or opposition-led armed violence, rather than domestic pressures. Therefore, loss of civilian support is not sufficient for the government to fall.[xxviii]

Conclusion

This analysis contradicts several popular assumptions about the Egyptian uprising and the Arab Spring in general. First, the Egyptian “revolution,” as it was characterized by international media, was not a revolution, but rather an intifada or uprising. In comparison to a riot or a revolution, an intifada has limited democratization potential, as a result of its loose organization and lack of clearly defined objectives. Additionally, the military-as-government’s pacts with the Muslim Brotherhood provide conditions for limited liberalization of Egypt’s authoritarian government in Egypt, not democratization.

For those seeking democratization in Egypt, the limitations of intifadat as mechanisms of social change present important lessons. Networks should be formed during the mobilization process so that protestors can maintain continued organization after the initial reactionary uprising. The original organizers of the intifada must create clearly defined, actionable objectives. They should circulate these objectives to the masses throughout the course of the uprising. There must also be a general consensus among protesters that a military takeover is not an acceptable outcome. If the protestors wish to achieve their goal of democratization, then it is necessary to understand this dynamic in order to overcome it.

Written by Jennifer Fishkin

Jennifer Fishkin is a graduate of the SAIS Class of 2012, where she specialized in international economics and conflict management, as well as global theory and history. She has a B.S. from Cornell University in Industrial and Labor Relations with minors in Middle East Studies and International Relations.

On March 28, the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute (FPI) and The SAIS Review of International Affairs welcomed writer and investigative reporter Robert Neuwirth, who shared his acclaimed work on the value of informal economies with SAIS students and faculty. His work highlights the topic of the SAIS Review’s upcoming issue on black markets and shadow economies, due for release in June 2013.

In his latest book, Stealth of Nations, Neuwirth challenges conceptions of unregulated urban development by suggesting that informal economies must be acknowledged and incorporated into any inclusive and equitable development strategy. His first book, Shadow Cities, argued that shantytowns are legitimate urban neighborhoods, and that governments need to stop evictions and instead engage with squatters.

Neuwirth’s work has been supported by the MacArthur Foundation and the Fund for Investigative Journalism and has been featured inWired, the New York Times, and other publications, as well as on National Public Radio. In addition to writing and reporting, Neuwirth has taught in the college program at Rikers Island, New York City’s jail, and at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism.

Mr. Tadros, who is currently writing a book on the Copts and the modern politics of Egypt, shares his views on these topics:

• The role of Western states in the Arab Spring
• The desirability of liberalization and democratization
• The interaction between Wahhabism and political transition

Dr. Huang, who is a former World Bank country director for China, addresses the audience about China’s conflict between political and economic liberalization. Watch the clip below for Dr. Huang’s thoughts on the following:

• The connection between economic and political liberalization in China
• How the Chinese Communist Party manages a rising tide of citizen activism
• The possible effects of local-level political reform on Chinese public sentiment

On Monday, March 4, The SAIS Review will host a release event for the latest print issue The World in Transition. The editorial staff  invites you to an afternoon of celebration which will consist of a panel discussion and a reception starting at 4pm. If you would like to join us, please RSVP to SAIS.Review@gmail.com.

Rome Auditorium, Johns Hopkins SAIS
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC, 20036

Our Panelists

Yukon Huang is a senior associate in the Carnegie Endowment’s Asia Program. He was formerly the World Bank’s Country Director for China. His research focuses on China’s economy and its global and regional impact. Dr. Huang has published widely on development issues affecting China and East Asia. He is the A-List commentator for the Financial Times on China and his articles are seen frequently in the Wall Street Journal, Bloomberg, Foreign Affairs and other major media. His recent books include East Asia Visions which addresses future prospects for the region and Reshaping Economic Geography in East Asia which analyzes how the growth patterns have been shaped by spatial and economic factors. He has a PhD in economics from Princeton University and a BA from Yale University.

Samuel Tadros is a Research Fellow at Hudson Institute’s Center for Religious Freedom. He was a Senior Partner at the Egyptian Union of Liberal Youth, an organization that aims to spread the ideas of classical liberalism in Egypt. He has received his MA in Democracy and Governance from Georgetown University and his BA in Political Science from the American University in Cairo. Mr. Tadros has previously interned at the American Enterprise Institute, where he worked on the Muslim Brotherhood and worked as a consultant for the Hudson Institute on Moderate Islamic Thinkers, and most recently the Heritage Foundation on Religious Freedom in Egypt. In 2007 he was chosen by the State Department in its first Leaders for Democracy Fellowship Program in collaboration with Syracuse University’s Maxwell School.

Moderator

Charles Gati is a Foreign Policy Institute Senior Fellow at Johns Hopkins SAIS. He was a senior adjunct professor of Russian and Eurasian studies at SAIS. He served as a senior adviser with the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State. He also taught at Union College and Columbia University. His publications include The Bloc That Failed: Soviet-East Relations in Transition and Hungary and the Soviet Bloc. Dr. Gati received his PhD in international relations from Indiana University.

Ma Ying-jeou’s Re-Election and Beijing: Four More Years

The results of the Taiwanese elections generally reaffirmed voter satisfaction with Ma’s cooperative approach with China under the “1992 Consensus,” which states that there is only one China but that both sides interpret “one China” differently. In addition, Ma Ying-jeou also proclaims a “Three Noes” policy – no independence, no reunification, and no use of force – as the basis for cross-Strait negotiations. Based on this foundation, Ma’s first term saw significant cross-Strait economic cooperation, with 18 agreements signed that include the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) and the “three links” agreements on postal services and air and sea transport.^[2] In his inauguration speech in May 2012, Ma vowed to expedite further ECFA negotiations. Both sides also signed agreements on investment protection and customs cooperation in August, aiming to create a better environment for businesses on either side of the Strait.

However, voters have also raised concerns about increasing social inequality and possible over-dependence on economic ties with China under the Ma administration, leading more Taiwanese to vote for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2012 as compared to 2008. The DPP increased its Legislative Yuan (LY) seats from 27 to 40, while the KMT’s share of seats dropped from 81 to 64. Overall, broad economic engagement with China does remain popular, and Ma will continue to develop economic ties through the end of his term in 2016.

Closer political engagement is another issue. During the campaign, Ma proposed a cross-Strait peace accord but quickly backed away from promoting the plan as polls showed widespread disapproval; Ma has not returned to the idea since his re-election. Given the increasing voter support of the DPP, other smaller parties’ involvement in the legislative process this session, and the administration’s currently dismal approval ratings (hovering at 17.7%, mostly due to slowing economic growth), the Ma administration is unlikely to revisit close political cooperation. For example, Ma has stated that Taiwan will not officially cooperate with China over territorial disputes in the South China Sea and the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands.  Also, after Hu Jintao voiced Beijing’s hope for signing a peace accord with Taiwan in a speech during the 18th Party Congress, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Minister Wang Yu-chi responded that a peace accord is not a priority in Ma’s second term as conditions are not right. With the nature of Taiwan’s domestic politics and citizens’ strengthening Taiwanese identity, any movement that erodes Taiwan’s sovereignty and moves toward political integration with Beijing could backfire for the Ma administration.

To counter the criticism of economic over-dependence on China, Ma will have to ensure that Taiwan will not be marginalized in the Asia-Pacific region during his second administration. He has argued that ECFA will not only create conditions conducive for Taiwan to negotiate free-trade agreements (FTAs) with a range of countries, but also expand Taiwan’s opportunities to participate in Asia-Pacific economic integration, especially with the ASEAN countries. So far, only Singapore and New Zealand have participated in talks on FTAs with Taiwan. To realize the economic progress voters seek, the Ma administration will have to redouble its efforts to materialize the goals of joining regional economic integration, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)–despite opposition from the mainland.

PRC: New Leadership Takes the Stage

On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, the Chinese leadership transition process is in full swing with the ongoing 18th Party Congress. Taipei’s chief intelligence official believes that among top Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, Xi Jinping has the deepest understanding of cross-Strait issues; he spent 17 years in a combination of party, state, and military positions in nearby Fujian Province, including two years as provincial governor. In Fujian, Xi worked to boost cross-Strait trade and investment with a slogan of “do it now” (mashang jiu ban). Given his regional experience, Xi’s presumed succession has raised hopes in Taipei that he would take a more flexible and open-minded approach to relations, particularly vis-a-vis hawkish PLA generals. For example, Xi could potentially remove some of the approximately 1,600 missiles aimed at Taiwan as a symbolic gesture of goodwill.

However, the status quo in relations is likely to override a new approach for two reasons.  For one, Ma Ying-jeou’s reelection in 2012 validated both the mainland’s tacit acceptance of the 1992 Consensus and Hu Jintao’s “peaceful development” (heping fazhan) strategy of strengthening relations while maintaining the eventual goal of unification.  The CCP would like to avoid another pro-independence presidency like Chen Shui-bian’s from 2000 to 2008, so top leaders may view the success of “peaceful development” as a reason to continue a strategy that has brought victories for the KMT.

Another factor is the timeline of Xi’s own succession.  During the last round of transitions from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao, Hu gradually assumed three positions–the roles of the party secretary, the president of the PRC, and finally the head of the party and state Central Military Commissions (CMCs)–taking 2.5 years to gain all three.  This time around, Xi Jinping has already assumed both the party secretary and party CMC roles, which means that compared to Hu Jintao, he will more quickly assume control over the PLA.  However, consolidating his authority over the military will still take many months. Without firm control of the military, Xi will not be able to make any major changes to Taiwan policy.

Finally, even if Xi wanted to push for changes and was able to quickly consolidate control over the military, other high-ranking CPP members, including the other members of the new Politburo Standing Committee, will influence the mainland’s cross-Strait policy, and building consensus on a potential shift in cross-Strait relations will take time.  Given the host of domestic issues these new leaders face, such as slowing growth and worsening inequality, they will likely focus on more urgent domestic challenges rather than improving cross-Strait ties.

Though the next few years may not see a major shift in cross-Strait relations, by 2015, conditions may be ripe on both sides for change. By 2015, Xi Jinping and other fifth generation leaders will have consolidated their power. In Taiwan, the KMT and DPP candidates vying for their party’s presidential nomination for the 2016 election will have announced their visions for cross-Strait policy. A DPP presidency would likely lead to strains in the cross-Strait relationship, but a victory for the KMT may provide the best window of opportunity for further cooperation in the coming years.

Written by Cristina Garafola & Bao-chiun “Jingbo” Jing

Cristina Garafola is an M.A. candidate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and holds a certificate from the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies. Cristina has previously interned at the Department of State and most recently with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. She speaks Chinese, German, and is currently learning Burmese.

Bao-chiun “Jingbo” Jing is a 2012 M.A. graduate at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Bao-chiun has previously interned with the Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. He currently is a consultant with the International Institute at Graduate School USA.

[1] President Ma Ying-Jeou of the Kuomintang (KMT) won re-election by garnering 51.6 percent of the votes against 45.6 percent won by Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The KMT also retained the majority of Legislative Yuan (LY) by winning 64 out of 113 seats, while the DPP secured 40 seats; three other parties plus one independent won the remaining seats. Election results from Taiwan’s Central Election Commission, http://vote2012.cec.gov.tw/en/index.html

[2] In 2011, the amount of Taiwan’s exports to China reached $83.9 billion, an increase of 25 percent compared to 2008. See http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/28319282433.pdf

This election cycle, President Obama and Governor Romney are primarily focused on jobs and the economy, taxes and government spending, and social issues such as women’s reproductive health. While foreign policy typically takes a back seat to domestic issues on the stump, the Sino-American relationship has become a major focus of both campaigns.

Unfortunately, most of the campaign rhetoric on China has been inflammatory at best, and inaccurate at worst, particularly from the Republican ticket (though Democrats use incendiary rhetoric as well). Alluding to the tenser aspects of the U.S.-China relationship has become a particularly effective way to galvanize some American voters, not unlike the tactics utilized by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to consolidate public support in the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

The Chinese government and people are watching our election closely, and starting next January, either Mitt Romney or Barack Obama will have to navigate the complexities of the US-China relationship every day. The candidates would therefore be wise not to push their rhetoric too far, so as not to further alienate China. Additionally, Romney and Obama should avoid boxing themselves into a China policy-related corner, lest they have to fulfill these promises later as President. Still, it appears that Republican candidate Mitt Romney is not relenting. His comments on China have been increasingly provocative, and have not gone unnoticed in the PRC.

It is not unusual for a presidential candidate to criticize a foreign nation during an election. For example, regarding China, Democratic challenger Bill Clinton famously referred to the “butchers of Beijing” when criticizing President George Bush’s handling of Tiananmen Square. However, the stakes of the Sino-American relationship have never been so high. China is the United States’ third largest export market, we are their largest customers, and the Peoples’ Bank of China is the largest holder of U.S. treasury securities. While the economic relationship is vital to both states, disputes arise frequently and can last for years. Progress on trade and currency issues is often affected by domestic politics in either country. Furthermore, differences over other issues like Taiwan, human rights, military spending, influence in Asia, and cyber-security could be aggravated should the Chinese negatively interpret the increasingly hostile attitudes of the presidential candidates. Romney and Obama would be wise to exercise caution.

Though it is primarily a Republican tactic, both parties are prone to evoking Sino-American disputes to bolster their campaigns.  There is some hostility in the Democratic Party towards China, particularly from labor factions who fear the unfair transfer of jobs, technology, and intellectual property to China. Human rights activists, another faction of the Democratic establishment, also find much to object to in the PRC.

Anti-China sentiment primarily comes from the right, however. In spite of China’s now undeniable capitalism, the “big government” style of the PRC doesn’t conform to the Republican ideal, and the Christian right disapproves of the institutionalized atheism in China. Neo-conservatives, taking an ideological interpretation of international relations, view the Chinese ascent in power as directly contributing to America’s decline.

Many in the Republican Party assume that the relationship with China is a directly competitive one—a zero-sum game. This conception perhaps helps to explain some of Mitt Romney’s more inflammatory remarks thus far. He has repeatedly promised to label China as a currency manipulator on “day one” of his presidency, risking a trade war, despite the cautions of some in his party, including former candidate and U.S. Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman. On the campaign trail, Mitt Romney has also stated “the Chinese are smiling all the way to the bank, taking our jobs and taking a lot of our future.” Romney’s insinuation here is that China’s economic improvement is directly worsening our economy—a dangerous message indeed.

Romney’s China protestations extend beyond economic quarrels. In a Republican primary debate last year, Romney exclaimed that “China is stealing our intellectual property—our patents, our designs, our know-how, our brand names.” “They’re hacking into our computers,” Romney said, “stealing information from not only corporate computers, but from government computers.”

Many of Mitt Romney’s concerns on China are valid. Most experts agree that their currency is undervalued, they are stealing our intellectual property and spying on our computers. However, China’s currency has been steadily appreciating over recent years, and it would be preposterous to demand that they accelerate appreciation of the renminbi (RMB) to its actual estimated value. If China did so, unemployment would skyrocket and the government would face an unparalleled economic crisis. Increases in defense and intelligence spending are unsavory to say the least, though not unexpected from a rapidly growing power.

In fact, President Obama shares Mitt Romney’s concerns. His administration has brought trade cases against China at a faster pace than the previous Republican administration. Regarding China’s political system, the President offered an implicit rebuke of its leadership while on a recent visit to Asia. “The freedom to speak your mind and choose your leaders, the ability to access information and worship how you please,” he said, is a universal human desire.

President Obama has demonstrated more diplomatic finesse in his treatment of the PRC than Governor Romney has. “The United States does not seek to contain China,” Obama said on his trip to the country, “nor does a deeper relationship with China mean a weakening of our bilateral alliances. On the contrary, the rise of a strong, prosperous China can be a source of strength for the community of nations.” President Obama seems to understand the Chinese concept of saving face—a tradition that compels Chinese leaders to respond to any perceived international disrespect with authoritative statements or decisive actions. The Chinese leadership would have to respond to empty threats and public criticism from either candidate in order to avoid seeming weak, so the President has attempted to critique the Chinese system without undermining the importance of the alliance.

To a certain extent, the CCP understands that it has become a tradition for the candidates to attack each other by targeting China. According to Da Wei, an American Studies scholar at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), most Chinese leaders are aware that “the actual policies after taking office won’t be as harsh as the candidates claim during the stump speeches.” Da is optimistic that the candidates’ “rhetoric may even be weakened in the later stage of the campaign when they realize the complexity and importance of the relationship between the two powers.” Regardless of this possibility, Da explains, China must “take some precautions and prepare for any potential battles.” Ni Feng, deputy director of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has stated that “more confrontation [with China] will definitely be harmful for both domestic and foreign affairs.” The Chinese are clearly watching our election closely, and may even be making policy changes based on statements from the candidates.

With so much riding on the stability of our relationship with the Chinese, President Obama and Governor Romney must temper their criticism. Vacuous threats and critiques from presidential candidates don’t often translate directly into policy, but there is no telling how the Chinese will interpret them. While there are valid points to be made in attacking China’s foreign and domestic policies, lofty, patriotic-sounding rhetoric that casts China as an enemy is categorically harmful to our own interests.

“I know the Chinese are planning on getting to the Moon,” Mitt Romney told a crowd in Miami on August 13^th. “When they do, they will find an American flag that has been there for 43 years.” Unfortunately, the crowd went wild.

Written by Molly Silver

Molly Silver is a second year graduate student at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), where she is studying American Foreign Policy and International Economics. She also works as a Global Public Policy Intern at Facebook, and she assisted on Barack Obama’s presidential campaign over the summer.

Assuming that Xi’s appointment is assured, one can start to extrapolate China’s domestic and foreign policy priorities. What direction will Xi most likely lead China as it faces mounting challenges at home and abroad? Among them, three will represent the most challenging: managing the U.S.-China relationship, steering China away from a sharp economic slowdown and safeguarding domestic political cohesiveness.

“Acute economic competitors, political adversaries and military opponents”— that is how a leading Chinese periodical, Nanfengchuang (南风窗), characterized the nature of the U.S.-China relationship as being perceived by both sides of the Pacific in its coverage of Xi’s visit to the U.S. in February. On the Chinese side, the U.S.-China bilateral relationship has traditionally been the primary responsibility of the General Secretary or Chairman of the People’s Republic. Beginning with Deng Xiaoping in the 1980′s, every Chinese leader has personally taken the initiative to manage and balance the somewhat turbulent U.S.-China relationship and has gone a long way in defining the degree of cooperation or animosity between the two.

To this end, Xi’s recent visit to the U.S. can be used as a barometer to gauge his ability and willingness to work with his American counterparts on a wide range of issues. He did not shy away from difficult topics like China’s human rights record, calling his government’s position on the subject a “work in progress.” His charisma and ease with these high-profile meetings and dialogues stem from the fact that he, unlike many of his compatriots and predecessors on the Politburo, has frequently traveled abroad before his rise to the top echelons of power. While his understanding of America’s wider foreign policy agenda may be far ahead of that of the earlier generation, his foreign policy experience is limited. Over the last year, the Party has worked hard to boost Xi’s credentials and help him to grasp the deeper nuances that mark North and Southeast Asian relations, especially by promoting a series of meetings and summits over the last few months with representatives of Japan, South Korea and Russia.

Equally as important, one must understand the era in which Xi came of age and how his personal experiences in the Chinese countryside affected his leadership qualities as he moved up the ranks of the Communist party. His father was imprisoned in 1968 for his role in the publication of Liu Zhidan’s biography and was accused of leading an anti-Party clique. Short thereafter, Xi was sent off to the countryside in Shaan’xi Province during the “Down to the Countryside Movement.” He once reflected upon this period of his life saying that he “ate a lot more bitterness than most people.” Xi experienced firsthand the result of infighting, suspicion and politically driven mass movements. Without a doubt, this will shape his distrust of political adventurism and the type of cavalier ideological shocks to the system that is advocated by Bo.

Once he comes to power, Xi will have to balance the “backseat drivers”: a myriad of expectations, interests and demands from a modernizing military and provinces vying for development funds, as well as social welfare programs lacking sufficient support. Faced with the problems of a slowing economy, rampant corruption and the Bo Xilai scandal, the CCP’s propaganda and news outlets have turned to a renewed sense of nationalism to quell the turbulent political atmosphere. Distractions such as indigent and illegal foreigners and infringements on sovereign territory go a long way to mask growing uncertainties over the direction of the nation amid an economic slowdown of an unknown severity.

On the economic front, Xi is renown for possessing little tolerance for corruption and promoting fast but solid economic growth. Prior to his current Party position, he was Party chief and head of Shanghai, as well as the provinces of Zhejiang and Fujian. His earlier appointments brought him into the limelight for overseeing breakneck periods of economic growth and prosperity. In Fujian, where he was posted for 17 years, Xi rose from the position of vice mayor of Xiamen to governor of the province. Similarly, in Zhejiang, where he spent five years as the provincial head, he oversaw periods of up to 14 percent growth per year.

Today’s Chinese political landscape has moved glacially away from the “strong-man”—i.e. a rule by a single personality that often defines closed, one-party political systems. Thus, while Xi will most likely take the top position within the Party this fall and presidency of the People’s Republic in the spring of 2013, the trend towards consensus-building and collective management in domestic and foreign policy making means that his position as “first among equals” has limits. The possibility of a cult of personality, positive or not, threatens the Party rule. As Fukuyama describes in his ‘Bad Emperor’ theory, a good despot has the ability to take the lead and bypass checks and balances, but an incompetent or unpopular one may lead to disaster.

Western analysts are becoming increasingly aware of the extent to which intra-Party rivalry and factionalization exist among the top circles of power. Xi, like Bo, has been labeled as a “princeling,” a growing class of mid to high ranking Communist Party officials whose have risen to power on the coattails of their parents. They stand in contrast to the Communist Youth League faction of Party leaders who were groomed under Hu Jintao’s tutelage. This second generation of CCP cadres has worked hard to create the aura that they are the sole true defenders of the Communist faith, a perception which has garnered resentment by some. Shifts in the composition of the Politburo Standing Committee may bring to the fore competing interests between Hu’s Communist Youth League, Shanghai Clique and other circles within the Party. This intra-Party discourse and potential for disagreement may be an opportunity for Xi to position himself as the bridge to compromise within the Standing Committee.

The larger power transition within the CCP is already under way in cities and provinces around the country. Xi’s appointment aside, the central Politburo changes coming later on this year may end up being less harmonious than most predict. At the moment, observers in and outside China have only managed a consensus on the fact that Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are shoo-ins for the top two positions in the Politburo Standing Committee. Boxun (a site which shot to fame by providing inside information leading up to the Bo Xilai dismissal) has published reports stating that the upcoming Standing Committee will be reduced from nine to seven members. If true, the struggle to determine the composition and makeup for that body will a game of tug of war among Xi, Hu, larger power brokers and interest groups vying for control.

Written by Bernard Geoxavier

Bernard Yudkin Geoxavier is a Master’s Candidate at the Hopkins – Nanjing Center in Nanjing,  China, writing his research thesis in Chinese on a new direction in China’s foreign policy.  Before coming to the center he was a Chinese instructor at Belmont Hill School in Belmont, Massachusetts and graduated from Middlebury College with a degree in Chinese Literature and History.

A Prepared Plan

Why do we see this repeated cycle but never a progress? When observing North Korea’s behavior in the last few decades, one can deduce that North Korea has long determined its ultimate goals and the path to achieve them, regardless of what the policies are in Washington, Seoul, or Beijing. North Korea’s ultimate goals, according to what the official North Korean media repetitively reports, are the following: recognition as a nuclear weapon state, withdrawal of U.S. forces (USFK) from the Korean peninsula, and reunification of the peninsula under the North Korean regime.

We observed three generations of Kims pursuing the same policy of developing nuclear capability to achieve those goals. The previous launches of long-range missiles in 2006 and 2009 were both followed by nuclear experiments. Given the fact that the combination of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and nuclear warheads gives birth to nuclear weapons, those missile launches and nuclear experiments clearly demonstrate to the world what North Korea is preparing for. In line with Pyongyang’s goals, the series of its defiant acts—missile development, nuclear test, and noncompliance of agreements—is quite understandable. Thus, we now should be aware that Pyongyang’s threat to conduct a nuclear test as a reaction to a certain U.S. or South Korean “statement” or “policy” is mere rhetoric.

China’s ambivalence

Because of the historical and strategic ties between North Korea and China, the world has high expectations for the role of China in resolving North Korean issues. Nonetheless, China shows great ambiguity toward Pyongyang’s behavior. On the one hand, China participates in the UN Security Council resolution and sanctions on North Korea and joins the Six Party Talks. On the other hand, China exports special military vehicles including missile launchers to North Korea. Moreover, Chinese President Hu Jintao has reaffirmed China’s traditional ties with Pyongyang after the recent rocket launch, meeting with a top North Korean envoy Kim Yong-il. China veils its position between the international community and North Korea. Beijing’s such haziness unintentionally encourages North Korea’s further provocations. James Steinberg, a former U.S. deputy secretary of state, stated that China should send an “unequivocal” message that any further provocations by the North will not be tolerated. “They need to make it clear toward the North Korean leadership that they will not tolerate these kinds of actions which actually create more instability,” he argued.

However, China—the communist brethren and the firm ally of North Korea—will not dramatically change its position to compress Kim Jong-un’s regime. China’s aim throughout the Six Party Talks is only to establish stability in Northeast Asia, not a regime change or denuclearization. Thus, the U.S. and China differ greatly in terms of their interests and objectives. Some may expect that “if China comes out from its ambiguity, North Korean problem will be solved.” Such expectation, rather, is fruitless since China will not easily change its strategy.

No option left?

During a debate among experts at the Asan Plenum conference on April 25, 2012, Chinese Maj. General (ret.) Pan Zhenqiang advised the four parties, namely the U.S., South Korea, Japan and Russia, not to use any offensive expressions such as “regime change,” but rather to make a more favorable environment for North Korea in order to encourage its reform. Ambassador Christopher Hill, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, vigorously responded to Pan’s statement by saying, “We never disrespect North Korea.” Then he added, “We did everything we could.”

Ambassador Hill’s “everything” comprises both dialogue and military options. Clearly, Washington and Seoul have both options in hand. Nevertheless, they have consistently pursued peaceful approaches because the 50 million South Koreans living in the Korean peninsula are literally “held hostage” by North Korea—essentially eliminating the military option off the list for the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces. As a result, in response to Pyongyang’s deadly military attack on South Korean warship Cheonan and Yeonpyeong island in 2010, Seoul could do nothing but endure, because it has no military option other than the “war option” in the peninsula. If peaceful talks are proven to be ineffective and military retaliation is impossible, is there any option left in dealing with North Korea?

A third scenario

Pyongyang will keep pursuing its goal of becoming a nuclear weapon state while testing its missiles and nuclear materials. If China’s position remains ambiguous and if the U.S. and South Korea do not find a creative option to counteract North Korea, the world will observe one of the two scenarios: North Korea as a nuclear weapon state or a war on the Korean peninsula. We need a third scenario.

North Korean patterns of behavior will remain unchanged unless we change North Korea’s goals or offer a better goal. North Korea’s Achilles’ heel is its economic deprivation. Every country seeks prosperity, and North Korea is not an exception. Starting now, the U.S. and Korea should induce North Korea to integrate into the world economy, by cleverly using North Korea’s existing dependence on the few countries in the outside world—particularly its secret trade partners.

North Korea will carry out economic reforms at one point in the future. Before that point, the U.S. and South Korea should persuade Pyongyang with a better option of prosperity so that North Korea can be interested in the open economy and be willing to participate in it. Unless we provide North Korea a better goal, North Korean provocations will never end.

Written by Soo kook Kim

Soo kook Kim is a Researcher at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Republic of Korea. She received her BA in International Relations from Seoul National University and MA in Conflict Management from SAIS.

* The opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent the views of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Republic of Korea.

Many pundits are giddily predicting the end of American preeminence and China’s inevitable domination, but we have all seen that movie before. The declinists are proven wrong time after time. By contrast, Bremmer’s Every Nation For Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World (Portfolio, May 2012) provides a fresh perspective on world politics. It is an exciting contribution to the galaxy of big ideas on international affairs. Some of his conclusions are startling; he therefore warns his book is not “the feel-good movie of the year.”

In a concise 200 pages, Bremmer wastes no time getting to his point: to tackle today’s global challenges–from transnational threats to financial stability to managing energy needs–the world needs a dominant power that can “enforce compromise.” But given the shrinking power gap between countries, such a Leviathan is missing, and global institutions are getting rickety. Now, “many countries are strong enough to prevent the international community from taking action, but none has the political or economic muscle to remake the status quo. No one is driving the bus.”

The G7 is out-of-date while the G20 is too unwieldy, like “herding cats… together with animals that don’t like cats.” Hence the G-Zero. It’s a world of spoilers but no leaders, and it points to a potential downside to U.S. President Barack Obama’s strategy of “leading from behind.” Just when cooperation is most needed, it has become more difficult to achieve.

Origins of the G-Zero

Bremmer’s thesis reflects a growing consensus. Other thinkers have made similar arguments over the past few years. Council on Foreign Relations president Richard Haass, for example, calls this problem one of non-polarity. After the world witnessed two sides competing during the Cold War, we now live in a world in which no single state can drive cooperation. Like Bremmer, Haass suspects that, “The emergence of a non-polar world could prove to be mostly negative, making it more difficult to generate collective responses to pressing regional and global challenges.”

Similarly, Harvard scholar Joseph Nye has pointed out that power is becoming more diffuse in international politics, making the world more complex, like a “three-dimensional chess game.” Others who have noticed this problem include Nikolas Gvosdev, Harry Harding, John Ikenberry, Parag Khanna, Michael Mandelbaum, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Fareed Zakaria.

At Carnegie Council we hosted several of these thinkers in our “Rise of the Rest” series. In 2008 when we asked Harding whether cooperation would be possible in the face of rising powers, he responded optimistically. He said, one way cooperation would be possible is when “the problems are so great, both parties realize they have to work together or the consequences would be extremely dire. And I suspect climate change is going to be one. Perhaps energy security will be another.”

Harding has logic on his side. If the consequences of climate change are as catastrophic as some experts predict — from the mass extinction of species to the destruction of whole countries — it should compel countries to work together. Global pandemics and nuclear proliferation should do the same. Given that the human race has avoided apocalyptic scenarios in the past, it stands to reason that it will continue to do so. Bremmer also concedes the G-Zero world is temporary; we will see the power vacuum filled if we do not see a global cataclysm first.

Although Bremmer contends his book is not the story of “the rise of the rest,” the problem he has identified is a direct consequence of the relative rise of non-Western states. To this point, his chapter titled “The Road to G-Zero” could serve as an overview of any college International Relations 101 course that teaches how the world developed since 1945. Washington-led globalization has “created multiple emerging alternatives to American power, including a loose collection of developing countries with leaders looking to satisfy public demand for a more prominent global role by dabbling in international politics. They want status.”

But isn’t this new world what the architects of American grand strategy, such as Dean Acheson, envisioned after World War II? The deal that the United States struck with the world after 1945 was that it would provide secure trade routes, stability, and the opportunity for other countries to become prosperous. In other words, the United States provided public goods. In return, other states would accept American preeminence and would play by American-designed rules. Surely the American architects foresaw that this project could be so successful that it would facilitate a narrowing of power between countries. Bremmer seems to feign surprise at this outcome in order to underscore the danger a G-Zero world poses.

The idea that this world of change carries risk goes back to the realist school of international relations. Princeton scholar Robert Gilpin demonstrated in his classic book War & Change in World Politics (1981) that when the power balance between countries shifts, conflict and even war are more likely. It is for this reason, that analysts have worried about the rise of the rest. Indeed many of Bremmer’s big ideas over the years have revolved around change and international relations theory.

His The J Curve riffed on an older theory in trade economics to predict instability during political change. In his last book, The End of the Free Market, Bremmer resurrected the 19th-century German idea of state capitalism to anticipate tension between China and free market America. In this regard, Bremmer is an innovator in the truest sense. Like Steve Jobs and the iPad, Bremmer improves ideas and brings them to new audiences.

He presents his view in a clear, logical way and with an urgent tempo that gives the reader the feeling of being in a cinematic briefing in the White House. One can flip through his book and get the point in a matter of minutes. What makes Bremmer’s books consistently interesting are the insights he has gathered from traveling the world talking with insiders, the practical applications of his ideas, and his use of colorful stories to illustrate his points. He also happens to be correct on the great questions of our time, skeptical about the sustainability of China’s rise and America’s so-called inevitable decline.

The Future of the G-Zero World

In the most daring chapter, Bremmer makes some stark predictions. Will countries cooperate in a G-Zero world? Unlike Harding, Bremmer is pessimistic. He outright dismisses a continuation of pure American hegemony and outlines four scenarios based on the direction of U.S.-China relations, which he sees as the most important relationship in the world. A rosy world of U.S.-China cooperation, where other countries are weak, would produce a G2 dynamic where the U.S. and China would run the show. If other countries are strong under U.S.-China cooperation, he sees a “concert” of powers or a G20 that “actually works.” He finds the scenarios above unlikely.

Instead, Bremmer predicts U.S.-China friction will be the baseline. If U.S.-China conflict prevails while other countries remain weak, he predicts a “Cold War 2.0″ where the “weapons of war will probably be economic,” and the two powers vie for influence. That is the second-most likely scenario. Bremmer’s most likely scenario is what he calls “a world of regions — to each his own.” This is a world with strong states but “without global leadership, one in which many of the rest will rise, but only to tackle local and regional issues” — thus the title of the book. Welcome to a version of “The Clash of Civilizations.”

Bremmer throws in a fifth, wild-card scenario called, “the G-Subzero,” in which “the G-Zero creates the kinds of problems that discredit the state, cripple its credibility, and arouse enough public anger that citizens look for alternatives.” In this Mad Max dystopia, power could disintegrate from states to local governments, neighborhoods, gangs, criminals, or militants.

While it’s no Hollywood flick, Bremmer’s story ends on a happy note. When America competes on a level playing field, he cheers, it is tough to beat. To that end, he recommends that the United States get back to basics, reinvest in globalization, and pursue fiscal responsibility and free trade for example by supporting the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Bremmer rightly reminds us, “There are always second acts in American life. Anyone who believes American decline is inevitable has chosen to ignore the history of the United States and its people.” If policymakers heed his advice and break the stasis in Washington, get ready for American resurgent power, the sequel.

Written by Devin Stewart

Devin T. Stewart is senior program director and senior fellow at Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs. He first joined Carnegie Council as program director in 2006. He also is a Next Generation Fellow, a Truman Security Fellow, and an adjunct assistant professor in international affairs at Columbia University and New York University. He has previously published in the SAIS Review, and he received his M.A. from Johns Hopkins SAIS in 1999.